

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-12

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

S E C R E T STATE 029671

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, SW, ETRD

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL: ASEA CASE

REF: STOCKHOLM 165

1. DURING JANUARY 24-25 TALKS WITH DOD/ISA ELLEN FROST
AND EUR RICHARD VINE, ASEA VICE CHAIRMAN PETER WALLENBERG
TOUCHED UPON ASEA EXPORT TO POLAND OF THREE AXIS
NUMERICALLY CONTROLLED MACHINE TOOLS. CLAIMING UNFAMILI-
ARITY WITH THE DETAILS OF THE CASE, WALLENBERG STRESSED
THAT US AND SWEDEN SHARED COMMON GOAL IN WANTING TO DENY
THE WARSAW PACT TECHNOLOGY WHICH COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT
ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST. IN A LATER CONVERSATION WITH RON WOODS (EUR/NE), HE
REITERATED THIS LINE, SAYING THAT DIFFERENT ASSESSMENTS
WOULD CERTAINLY EXIST ON WHAT TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY SHOULD BE
RESTRICTED. IN THESE CASES A FRANK INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF
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VIEWS WAS THE BEST COURSE TO AVOID FRICTION GENERATED BY
MISUNDERSTANDINGS. WALLENBERG MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS
SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF AND NOT THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT.

2. DURING THESE AND OTHER RECENT DISCUSSIONS DURING
VISITS OF LEIF LEIFLAND AND GENERAL OLIN (WHO RAISED ASEA

WITH ELLEN FROST), US OFFICIALS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY

WERE NOT SPEAKING FROM A COORDINATED US GOVERNMENT POSITION, BUT RATHER WERE SHARING VIEWS ON A POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS SWEDISH EXPOSURE TO DIVERSE WASHINGTON THINKING HAS BEEN USEFUL. THIS IS, AFTER ALL, THE REASON WHY SWEDES SUCH AS WALLENBERG, LEIFLAND AND OLIN VISIT HERE. IN EACH CASE, THE VISITORS HAVE SEEMED NOT ONLY WILLING BUT INTERESTED IN FRANK DISCUSSION.

3. WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY ASSESSMENT THAT SWEDISH FIRMS ARE UNLIKELY TO GO AGAINST US GUIDELINES, BOTH BECAUSE OF SHARED EAST/WEST INTERESTS AND ALSO SO AS NOT TO ENDANGER CONTINUED ACCESS TO US MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY. THAT IS WHY WE WERE SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED WHEN ASEA DISCUSSIONS WERE TERMINATED LAST YEAR, BEFORE GUIDELINES USED BY THE US WERE PROVIDED FOR ASEA CONSIDERATION.

4. WE MAY WISH TO HOLD BILATERAL TALKS WITH SWEDEN AND WITH OTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MONITORING THE TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES TO THE EAST. WE THEREFORE, WANT TO HOLD OPEN THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR TALKS MADE DURING LEIFLAND'S VISIT. THESE WOULD NOT BE TO ATTEMPT TO APPLY US LAW OR COCOM REGULATIONS IN SWEDEN, AS SUGGESTED BY NIKLASSON (REFTEL). RATHER THEY WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY MEANS TO WORK
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TOGETHER MORE EFFECTIVELY IN SUPPORT OF OUR COMMON INTEREST IN DENYING THE EAST STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY WHICH IF TRANSFERRED COULD NEGATIVELY AFFECT US AND SWEDISH SECURITY. EMBASSY VIEWS WILL OF COURSE BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT IN DECIDING WHETHER AND IF SO HOW TO APPROACH THIS ISSUE WITH SWEDES.

5. THE SIX AXIS MACHINE CITED IN PARA SIX OF REFTEL WAS AN INDUSTRIAL ROBOT, CLASSIFIED AS A GENERAL INDUSTRIAL MACHINE THAT MAY BE EXPORTED TO THE USSR UNDER GENERAL LICENSE, I.E., NO COCOM RESTRICTIONS. THE CINCINNATI MILACRON MACHINE EXHIBITED WAS THE MODEL 6CH MANIPULATING ARM HAVING SIX AXES OF CONTROL. A ROBOT CONTROLLER IS A DEDICATED SYSTEM NOT USEFUL FOR CONTROLLING METALWORKING EQUIPMENT. SUCH EQUIPMENT IS CURRENTLY FREELY LICENSED G-DEST (NO SPECIAL U.S. LICENSE REQUIRED). VANCE

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